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Neo-Schumpeterian streams of research emphasize the close relationship between changes in 
economic structure in favour of high-skill and high-tech branches and rapid economic growth. 
They  identify  the  emergence  of  a  new  technological  paradigm,  strongly  based  on  the 
application of information and communication technologies (ICTs), in the 1970s, arguing that 
in such periods of transition and emergence of new techno-economic paradigms the relatively 
less  developed  countries  have  higher  opportunities  to  catch-up.  Although  this  debate  is 
theoretically well documented, the empirics seem to lag behind the theory. In this paper, we 
contribute to this literature by adding illuminating evidence on the issue. More precisely, we 
relate the growth experiences of countries which had relatively similar economic structures in 
the late 1970s, with changes occurring in these countries’ structures between 1979 and 2003. 
The results reveal a robust relationship between structure and (labour) productivity growth, 
and  lend  support  to  the  view  that  producing  (though  not  user)  ICT-related  industries  are 
strategic branches of economic activity. 
 
Keywords: Structural change, Economic growth, Technical change. 
JEL-Codes: O10; O30. 
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1. Introduction 
Structural change refers primarily to changes in the sectoral composition of the economy 
(Wang and Szirmai, 2008; Silva and Teixeira, 2008), and may be driven either by demand-
side  factors,  such  as  changes  in  domestic  demand  and  in  the  structure  of  exports,  or  by 
supply-side factors, such as the re-allocation of labour and capital to more efficient uses.  
The last two decades witnessed a new revival of interest on structural change and on its 
relationship with economic growth, which seems to be primarily related with the spread of 
neo-Schumpeterian theses (Silva and Teixeira, 2008). According to the arguments expressed 
in this branch of the economic literature [see especially Perez (1985) and Freeman and Perez 
(1988)], the emergence of major technological breakthroughs has a profound impact in the 
restructuring of the techno-economic and in the socio-institutional spheres of the economy. 
With  respect  to  the  sectoral  composition  of  the  economy,  the  introduction  of  a  new 
‘technological paradigm’ (Dosi, 1982) originates significant changes, with the dynamic set of 
industries  that  is  more  closely  related  with  its exploitation  assuming  progressively  higher 
importance and stimulating growth, whereas sectors associated with older technologies see 
their influence diminish. Along with these important developments, some theoretical models 
within the more orthodox branch of economics came also into play suggesting that countries 
specializing in high-tech sectors would observe high rates of productivity growth relative to 
other countries (Lucas, 1993; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Lucas (1988) even suggested 
that it could pay off for a country to change its specialization pattern from low to high tech 
sectors by adopting adequate policy measures.  
The emphasis put by these theoretical approaches on the relationship between technology 
advanced industries and economic growth, together with the debate on the impact of ICT on 
aggregate  productivity  growth,  gave  rise  to  a  number  of  empirical  studies  examining  the 
impact of structural change on economic growth (e.g., Fagerberg, 2000; Timmer and Szirmai, 
2000; Peneder, 2003; Wang and Szirmai, 2008). Some of these studies consider a relatively 
large group of countries, taking together countries with marked structural differences (e.g., 
Fagerberg, 2000; Amable, 2000; Peneder, 2003), whereas others focus on individual countries 
or regions’ experiences (e.g., Nelson and Pack, 1999; Timmer and Szirmai, 2000; Engelbrecht 
and Xayavong, 2007; Wang and Szirmai, 2008). To our knowledge, however, no attempt has 
been  made  yet  to  assess  the  specific  role  of  technology-led  branches  in  relatively  less 
developed countries’ growth trajectories. Moreover, the analysis of the impact of structural   3 
change on economic growth with respect to these countries has been carried out in essentially 
descriptive terms (i.e., using shift-share and growth accounting techniques), without making 
an assessment of the causality chains between changes occurring at the industry and macro 
levels of the economy.  
In the present paper, we investigate the relationship between structural change and economic 
growth, adopting an econometric approach and taking into account a set of 10 ‘relatively less 
developed’  countries  in  the  late  1970s  (Portugal,  Spain,  South  Korea,  Greece,  Taiwan, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Austria and Finland). This restricted range of countries results from two 
fundamental aspects. First, the purpose of this work is not so much to assess globally the 
impact  of  technology-led  sectors  on  economic  growth,  an  issue  that  has  already  been 
addressed  in  the  literature  (e.g.,  Fagerberg,  2000;  Peneder,  2003),  but  to  investigate  their 
specific  importance  with  respect  to  relatively  less  developed  countries.  The  period  under 
analysis (1979-2003) was characterised by the emergence of a new technological paradigm, 
strongly based on the application of information and communication technologies (Freeman 
and Soete, 1997), which replaced the previous paradigm based on low-cost oil and mass-
production technologies. According to some views expressed within the new Schumpeterian 
approach (e.g., Perez, 1985), it is precisely in periods of transition and emergence of new 
techno-economic  paradigms  that  the  relatively  less  developed  countries  have  higher 
opportunities to catch-up. In these circumstances, it seems pertinent to compare economies 
that faced similar growth problems in the late 1970s and which have experienced widely 
different growth trajectories since then, and relate those experiences with changes occurring at 
the  industry  level  of  the  economy.  Secondly,  given  the  strong  empirical  rejection  of  the 
hypothesis  of  a  common  growth  model  for  all  countries  in  favour  of  the  hypothesis  of 
different  convergence  clubs  (e.g.,  Durlauf  and  Jonhson,  1992;  Färe  et  al.,  2006),  it  does 
indeed seem more reasonable to analyse separately a group of economies that shared similar 
structural characteristics at the beginning of the period under study.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 identifies the list of countries to be compared by 
applying hierarchical cluster analysis. Section 3 provides a descriptive characterisation of the 
growth  and  structural  change  processes  of  the  selected  countries  during  the  period  under 
study.  It is shown that  a striking increase in the countries’ dissimilarities came into play 
during this period, and an association between changes in economic performance and changes 
in economic structure is hypothesised. In Section 4, this hypothesis is examined through the 
estimation of a panel data regression, considering fixed effects methods. The results reveal a   4 
robust relationship between structure and (labour) productivity growth and lend some support 
to the view that ICT-related industries are strategic branches of economic activity, but only 
when producing industries are considered. The final section presents a brief summary and 
concludes. 
2. Determining countries’ structural similarity: a cluster analysis  
2.1. Some considerations on the data  
In order to identify the group of relatively less developed countries which shared similar 
structural characteristics in the late 1970s, a comparison of 21 countries (20 OECD members 
plus Taiwan) is undertaken.
1 This comparison is based on the countries’ per capita income 
and on the relative importance of the countries’ industry groups defined according to two 
complementary taxonomies: a taxonomy from Peneder (2002) which takes into account the 
industries’ skill requirements,
2 and a taxonomy based on technological characteristics from 
Tidd et al. (2001), which constitutes a refinement of Pavitt’s original classification scheme 
(Pavitt, 1984). More precisely, we compare the relative shares of low, medium and high-skill 
industries, as well as the relative shares of supplier-dominated, scale-intensive, specialised 
supplier, information-intensive and science-based industries in total VAB and employment 
figures. Along with these variables, we also consider a measure of the aggregate stock of 
human capital, expressed by the average number of years of formal education of the working 
age  population  (25  to  64  years).  The  choice  of  this  variable  reflects  the  crucial  role  of 
education  in  determining  the  capacity  to  assimilate  advanced  technologies  from  more 
developed countries, and to foster rapid structural change and economic growth.
3  
With regard to per capita income, we use data from the World Economic Outlook Database 
(April 2008) of the  International Monetary  Fund. This database provides full information 
regarding per capita GDP based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) in current international 
dollars for a vast number of countries for the 1980-2007 period. 
Data on sectoral VAB and employment (in hours) are taken from the 60-Industry Database of 
the  Groningen  Growth  and  Development  Centre,  which  is  available  on-line  at 
http://www.ggdc.net. This database covers 26 countries for 56 industries classified according 
                                                 
1 The complete list of the countries considered can be found in Table 1. 
2 This taxonomy was originally developed for manufacturing industries only (Peneder, 2002), but O’Mahony and 
Vecchi (2002) provided an extension covering service sectors.  
3 See Fagerberg (1994) and Abramovitz (1986, 1994) for a discussion on the ‘technology-gap’ literature and on 
the specific concept of ‘social capability’.   5 
to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision 3. Table 1 presents our 
classification of the 56 industries according to the selected taxonomies.
4 
Table 1: Classification of sectors according to Peneder (2002)/O’Mahony and Vecchi (2002) and Tidd, Bessant 
and Pavitt’s (2001) taxonomies 




Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt 
(2001) 
01  Agriculture  Low-skill  Supplier-dominated 
02  Forestry  Low-skill  Supplier-dominated 
05  Fishing  Low-skill  Supplier-dominated 
10-14  Mining and quarrying  Low-skill  Scale-intensive 
15-16  Food, drink & tobacco  Low-skill  Scale-intensive 
17  Textiles  Low-skill  Supplier-dominated 
18  Clothing  Low-skill  Supplier-dominated 
19  Leather and footwear  Low-skill  Supplier-dominated 
20  Wood & products of wood and cork  Medium-skill  Supplier-dominated 
21  Pulp, paper & paper products  Medium-skill  Supplier-dominated 
22  Printing & publishing  Medium-skill  Supplier-dominated 
23  Mineral oil refining, coke & nuclear fuel  Medium-skill  Scale-intensive 
24  Chemicals    High-skill  Science-based 
25  Rubber & plastics  Low-skill  Specialised supplier 
26  Non-metallic mineral products  Low-skill  Scale-intensive 
27  Basic metals  Low-skill  Scale-intensive 
28  Fabricated metal products  Medium-skill  Scale-intensive 
29  Mechanical engineering  High-skill  Specialised supplier 
30  Office machinery  High-skill  Specialised supplier 
313  Insulated wire  Medium-skill  Specialised supplier 
31-313  Other electrical machinery and apparatus nec  Medium-skill  Science-based 
321  Electronic valves and tubes  Medium-skill  Specialised supplier 
322  Telecommunication equipment  Medium-skill  Specialised supplier 
323  Radio and television receivers  Medium-skill  Science-based 
331  Scientific instruments  Medium-skill  Specialised supplier 
33-331  Other instruments  Medium-skill  Specialised supplier 
34  Motor vehicles  Medium-skill  Scale-intensive 
351  Building and repairing of ships and boats  High-skill  Scale-intensive 
353  Aircraft and spacecraft  High-skill  Scale-intensive 
352+359  Railroad equipment and transport equipment nec  Medium-skill  Scale-intensive 
36-37  Furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing; recycling  Low-skill  Supplier-dominated 
40-41  Electricity, gas and water supply  Medium-skill  Scale-intensive 
                                                 
4 Branches 24 (“Chemicals”) and 50 (“Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles,…”) are defined as high-
skill  and  low-skill,  respectively,  although  to  be  precise  we  should  consider  them  as  medium/high-skill  and 
low/medium-skill. This simplified classification was introduced to reduce the number of industry groups to be 
compared,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  determination  of  broad  structural  characteristics  across  countries.  With 
respect to the Tidd et al. classification scheme, and following van Ark and Bartelsman (2004), we decided to 
include a separate category – non-market services – for the activities included in the 75, 80 and 85 ISIC rev.3 
codes (public administration, education and health services). Generally, non-profit activities obey a distinct logic 
in terms of the relationship between innovation and productivity growth (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; McDonald, 
2007), and therefore it seemed reasonable to include them in a separate category.   6 
45  Construction  Low-skill  Supplier-dominated 
50 
Sale,  maintenance  and  repair  of  motor  vehicles  and  motorcycles; 
retail sale of automotive fuel  Low-skill  Information-intensive 
51 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles  Medium-skill  Information-intensive 
52 
Retail  trade,  except  of  motor  vehicles  and  motorcycles;  repair  of 
personal and household goods  Low-skill  Information-intensive 
55  Hotels & catering  Low-skill  Supplier-dominated 
60  Inland transport  Low-skill  Information-intensive 
61  Water transport  Medium-skill  Information-intensive 
62  Air transport  High-skill  Information-intensive 
63 
Supporting  and  auxiliary  transport  activities;  activities  of  travel 
agencies  Medium-skill  Supplier-dominated 
64  Communications  High-skill  Information-intensive 
65  Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding  High-skill  Information-intensive 
66  Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security  Medium-skill  Information-intensive 
67  Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation  Medium-skill  Information-intensive 
70  Real estate activities  High-skill  Information-intensive 
71  Renting of machinery and equipment  Low-skill  Information-intensive 
72  Computer and related activities  High-skill  Specialised supplier 
73  Research and development  High-skill  Specialised supplier 
741-3  Legal, technical and advertising  High-skill  Specialised supplier 
749  Other business activities, nec  High-skill  Information-intensive 
75  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security  Medium-skill  Non-market services 
80  Education  High-skill  Non-market services 
85  Health and social work  Medium-skill  Non-market services 
90-93  Other community, social and personal services  Medium-skill  Supplier-dominated 
95  Private households with employed persons  Medium-skill  Supplier-dominated 
99  Extra-territorial organizations and bodies  Medium-skill  Non-market services 
 
With  regard  to  our  measure  of  human  capital  stock,  most  of  the  data  were  taken  from 
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001). The authors extend de la Fuente and Doménech’s (2000) 
earlier computations, determining the average number of years of formal education of the 
working  age  population  on  an  annual  basis  over  the  1971-1998  period.
5  We  consider 
additionally Barro and Lee’s (2001) estimates for the same variable for Korea and Taiwan, 
because these countries were not taken into account in Bassanini and Scarpetta’s work.
6 
Table 2 presents the list of variables considered for our sample of 21 countries.  
                                                 
5 Up to the early 1980s Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) interpolate the five-year estimates provided by de la 
Fuente and Doménech (2000), whereas from that date onwards they calculate average years of education based 
on data from the OECD Education at a Glance (various issues), and consider the cumulative years of schooling 
in each educational level described in the OECD (1998: 347). 
6 Barro and Lee (2001) show that the estimates of educational attainment based on OECD data are quite similar 
to their own measures, and therefore the inclusion of a different source of information does not seem to be 
problematic.  The  major  differences  arise  with  respect  to  Germany  and  the  UK,  because  of  a  different 
classification of educational attainment between the OECD and the UNESCO sources.   7 
Table 2: Industry shares in VAB and employment hours (%), average number of years of formal education of the working age population and per capita income (1979, various 
countries) 
  Low-skill  Medium-skill  High-skill  Sup.-Dominated  Scale-intensive  Spec. supplier  Science-based  Inf.-Intensive  Non-market serv.  Education  PPPpcGDP
1 
  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  YEARS  C. int. $  
Australia  40,7  48,1  31,0  34,8  28,3  17,1  25,1  30,6  19,7  13,4  5,6  5,4  1,8  1,5  31,1  33,0  16,7  16,0  11,5  9.809,8 
Austria  42,0  56,6  35,7  28,0  22,2  15,5  28,2  42,8  14,8  11,7  6,1  6,5  2,4  1,9  31,9  22,6  16,6  14,6  10,3  10.495,0 
Belgium  32,8  40,7  36,3  37,8  30,9  21,6  18,4  24,2  17,1  13,9  11,0  6,5  4,2  3,6  29,4  29,5  19,9  22,3  9,2  9.758,3 
Canada  39,1  46,1  33,3  35,1  27,6  18,9  22,8  31,5  18,7  11,1  5,5  6,9  1,9  1,7  32,6  30,2  18,5  18,6  12,0  11.119,8 
Denmark  32,3  41,8  38,7  37,4  29,0  20,8  21,2  28,7  9,7  9,2  7,1  7,7  1,7  1,7  37,9  28,5  22,3  24,2  10,5  10.038,2 
Finland  37,5  51,8  38,2  33,5  24,4  14,6  33,4  43,2  13,2  8,6  6,3  5,6  2,0  1,4  30,0  23,5  15,1  17,6  9,5  8.763,6 
France  33,3  45,1  33,4  34,2  33,4  20,8  23,5  33,7  11,5  11,5  10,7  8,2  2,8  1,8  34,2  25,7  17,2  19,0  9,5  9.985,8 
Germany   31,0  41,9  39,1  38,0  30,0  20,0  21,0  28,4  16,6  14,5  11,4  10,1  5,3  4,0  28,7  24,3  16,9  18,6  11,2  9.796,7 
Greece  53,4  69,8  21,9  20,0  24,7  10,2  38,9  55,6  9,5  9,8  2,9  3,3  0,9  0,9  34,7  20,6  13,0  9,9  7,9  8.515,3 
Ireland  49,7  55,1  24,3  28,2  26,0  16,7  35,8  42,7  13,8  13,0  11,3  5,1  3,1  1,9  24,3  21,2  11,8  16,0  8,4  6.612,4 
Italy  42,2  52,0  31,0  31,4  26,7  16,6  29,9  40,4  13,4  11,8  9,3  6,9  3,7  2,7  31,0  22,3  12,7  16,0  7,3  8.999,2 
Japan  41,7  57,8  32,1  27,4  26,2  14,8  29,1  45,7  13,4  8,5  6,5  7,0  3,9  2,4  37,7  29,1  9,4  7,3  10,1  8.901,2 
Korea  57,2  71,7  26,3  20,7  16,4  7,5  41,7  59,7  12,5  7,8  4,8  4,2  4,3  2,3  27,1  19,6  9,5  6,3  6,8
1  2.486,8 
Netherlands  33,0  39,4  41,0  40,7  25,9  19,8  21,9  31,3  15,0  10,0  6,3  6,1  4,0  3,2  29,3  27,7  23,5  21,7  10,0  10.696,1 
Norway  37,8  42,6  36,2  39,1  26,0  18,2  19,6  31,4  21,8  11,1  4,8  5,0  2,0  1,7  34,6  28,2  17,2  22,6  10,6  12.576,6 
Portugal  49,3  64,2  30,4  26,0  20,2  9,8  33,4  54,4  11,7  9,6  6,1  2,4  2,2  1,6  33,8  19,9  12,8  12,1  6,9  5.130,1 
Spain  46,6  60,9  29,7  26,0  23,7  13,2  32,1  46,3  14,8  11,0  5,3  3,9  2,9  2,0  31,9  23,7  13,0  13,1  6,3  7.287,5 
Sweden  27,5  36,8  43,6  42,6  28,9  20,7  23,4  29,2  12,2  10,5  8,1  8,0  2,0  1,8  31,8  24,8  22,4  25,9  10,0  9.953,5 
Taiwan  47,0  63,5  31,9  26,7  21,1  9,8  30,3  47,7  18,0  9,4  6,5  8,2  5,0  4,7  29,4  21,5  10,8  8,4  6,4
1  3.355,7 
UK  34,8  43,7  34,4  33,8  30,9  22,5  21,1  27,3  18,8  15,5  9,6  8,8  3,2  2,9  30,4  27,8  16,9  17,7  10,0  8.636,4 
US  31,8  37,1  37,5  37,7  30,7  25,2  18,9  25,6  14,4  10,7  9,2  8,5  2,7  1,9  35,9  29,0  19,0  24,3  12,2  12.255,1 
Average  40,0  50,8  33,6  32,3  26,3  16,9  27,1  38,1  14,8  11,1  7,3  6,4  3,0  2,3  31,8  25,4  16,0  16,8  9,4  8.817,8 
Std. Dev.  8,1  10,7  5,4  6,4  4,1  4,7  6,9  10,6  3,3  2,1  2,4  2,0  1,2  0,9  3,4  3,9  4,1  5,7  1,8  2.602,3 
Max.  57,2  71,7  43,6  42,6  33,4  25,2  41,7  59,7  21,8  15,5  11,4  10,1  5,3  4,7  37,9  33,0  23,5  25,9  12,2  12.576,6 
Min.  27,5  36,8  21,9  20,0  16,4  7,5  18,4  24,2  9,5  7,8  2,9  2,4  0,9  0,9  24,3  19,6  9,4  6,3  6,3  2.486,8 
Source: Composition of economic activity: GGDC – 60 Industry Database; Education: Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) and Barro and Lee (2001); Per capita income: IMF - World Economic Outlook Database (April 
2008).  
Notes: 1) Year of reference 1980.   8 
As we can observe from Table 2, countries with larger per capita incomes tend to have higher 
educational  capital  stocks  and  relatively  higher  shares  of  high-skill  industries.  Inversely, 
countries with relatively low levels of GDP per capita income and human capital have higher 
shares  of  low-skill  and  supplier-dominated  industries  (the  industry  group  with  fewer 
technological opportunities).The US and Germany, for example, belong to the first group of 
countries, whereas Portugal, Greece and Korea are good representatives of the second, less 
developed group of countries.  
This  impression  is  confirmed  by  the  computation  of  Pearson  bi-variate  correlation 
coefficients, considering both data on VAB or employment variables (cf. Table 3). The high 
positive  relationship  between  education  and  per  capita  income  and,  inversely,  the  strong 
negative relationship of each of these variables and the relative shares of low-skilled and less 
innovative industries is clearly apparent. All the correlation coefficients relating education (or 
per capita GDP) to either the shares of low-skill or supplier-dominated industries are negative 
and strongly significant. 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix  
VAB shares             
  High-skill  Science-based  Spec. supplier  Sup.-dominated  Education  GDPper capita 





Science-based    1,00  0,46
**  -0,06  -0,24  -0,37 
Specialised supplier       1,00  -0,43
**  0,19  0,16 
Supplier-dominated          1,00  -0,72
***  -0,75
*** 
Education             1,00  0,82
*** 
GDP per capita                1,00 
             
Employment shares             
  High-skill  Science-based  Spec. supplier  Sup.-dominated  Education  GDPper capita 





Science-based    1,00  0,52
**  -0,18  -0,17  -0,27 
Specialised supplier       1,00  -0,67
***  0,51
**  0,36 
Supplier-dominated          1,00  -0,76
***  -0,76
*** 
Education             1,00  0,82
*** 
GDP per capita                1,00 
             
Notes: N = 21;***, ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
2.2. Hierarchical clustering results 
Cluster analysis involves a number of different procedures that allow for the division of a 
specific dataset into distinct groups, such that the degree of homogeneity is maximal if the   9 
observations belong to the same group and minimal otherwise. In the present study, because 
we have a relatively small dataset, we use the hierarchical clustering approach to classify the 
individual observations into clusters of maximum homogeneity.  
Hierarchical clustering identifies successive clusters by using previously established clusters. 
It can be either agglomerative or divisive, although the former is the most commonly used.
7 In 
the present case, we have opted for the agglomerative approach, starting with each case as a 
separate cluster and successively merging the two closest clusters until a single, all-inclusive 
cluster remains.  
The  application  of  hierarchical  agglomerative  clustering  requires  the  prior  definition  of  a 
criterion to determine the distance or similarity between cases. We apply the cosine similarity 
criterion,  although  there  is  no  clear-cut  indication  as  to  this  measure’s  superiority  in 
comparison to the others.
8 It also requires the definition of the rules for cluster formation. In 
the present case, we use the average linkage between groups method, also known as UPGMA 
(Unweighted  Pair  Group  Method  using  Arithmetic  averages).  This  method  defines  the 
distance between two clusters as the average distance between all pairs of cases in the two 
different  clusters.
9  Agglomerative  clustering  is  applied  to  the  standardised  scores  of  the 
variables,  rather  than  to  their  real  values,  because  they  are  measured  on  different  scales 
(industry share variables in percentage points, human capital in years, and per capita income 
in PPP current international US dollars).  
Figure  1  presents  the  resulting  dendrogram.  The  first  vertical  lines  represent  the  smallest 
rescaled distance, which in the present case corresponds to the merging of Portugal, Spain and 
Korea. Subsequent vertical lines represent merges at higher distances, until only one cluster, 
encompassing all cases, is obtained. 
                                                 
7 See Everitt et al. (2001) and Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1985) for more information on hierarchical cluster 
analysis and on cluster analysis procedures in general. 
8 Acknowledging the subjective nature of this choice, we have also considered distance measures, as well as the 
alternative similarity measure (the correlation of vectors). The resulting cluster solution was always the same. 
9  The  UPGMA  method  seems  to  be  preferable  relative  to  single  and  complete  linkage  rules,  since  it  uses 
information regarding all pairs of distances, and not just the nearest or the furthest.   10
 
                            Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
 
      C A S E       0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label        Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  Portugal      16   ─┐ 
  Spain         17   ─┼───┐ 
  Korea         13   ─┘   ├─────────┐ 
  Greece         9   ─────┘         ├───┐ 
  Taiwan        19   ───────────────┘   ├─────┐ 
  Ireland       10   ─────────┬─────────┘     ├─┐ 
  Italy         11   ─────────┘               │ ├─────────────────────┐ 
  Japan         12   ─────────────────────────┘ │                     │ 
  Austria        2   ───────────────────┬───────┘                     │ 
  Finland        6   ───────────────────┘                             │ 
  Australia      1   ───┬─┐                                           │ 
  Canada         4   ───┘ ├───────────────────┐                       │ 
  Norway        15   ─────┘                   │                       │ 
  Denmark        5   ───┬─┐                   │                       │ 
  US            21   ───┘ ├───┐               ├───────────────────────┘ 
  Sweden        18   ─────┘   ├─────────┐     │ 
  France         7   ─────────┘         │     │ 
  Belgium        3   ───┐               ├─────┘ 
  UK            20   ───┼───────────┐   │ 
  Germany        8   ───┘           ├───┘ 
  Netherlands   14   ───────────────┘ 
Figure 1: Dendrogram using average linkage between groups and the cosine similarity measure (1979) 
 
Generally, a good cluster solution is defined as being the one which precedes a sudden gap in 
the similarity (or distance) coefficient. In this case, the larger distance between sequential 
vertical lines occurs approximately between 15 and 25, suggesting that the best clustering 
solution splits the list of countries into two clusters:  
-  A cluster formed by Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Greece, Taiwan, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Austria and Finland (Cluster 1);  
-  And  a  cluster  including  Australia,  Canada,  Norway,  Denmark,  US,  Sweden,  France, 
Belgium, UK, Germany and the Netherlands (Cluster 2).
10 
The clustering solution thus separates our sample into a cluster of highly developed countries 
(Cluster 2), characterised by high levels of education and per capita income, and relatively 
higher  shares  of  innovative  and  high-skill  industries,  and  a  more  heterogeneous  cluster 
formed by relatively less developed countries (Cluster 1).  
As  can  be  seen  from  Table  4,  there  is  indeed  greater  dispersion  within  Cluster  1,  most 
particularly with regard to the per capita income variable. Countries such as Austria, Finland, 
Italy and Japan present considerably high values for this variable, close to the average value 
found for the countries included in Cluster 2, whereas Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and most 
                                                 
10 This result does not change with the consideration of different linkage rules.   11
notably, Korea and Taiwan, are very far behind (cf. Table 5). As a matter of fact, Austria, 
Japan and Finland are classified in Cluster 1 mainly because of their composition of economic 
activity, which is characterised by a greater reliance on supplier-dominated industries and the 
weaker relevance of high-skill industries comparatively to countries included in Cluster 2. In 
contrast,  countries  such  as  Korea,  Taiwan  and  Portugal  present  substantial  differences  in 
relation to the more developed countries in all the variables considered. These differences are 
particularly evident with respect to per capita income and human capital variables, and also in 
the (much higher) relevance of supplier-dominated industries.
11 
                                                 
11 It is worth mentioning, however, the contrasting evidence of Portugal, on the one hand, and of Taiwan and 
Korea, on the other, with respect to the relevance of science-based industries, which is considerably higher in 
these latter countries.   12 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics - Clusters 1 and 2 











(%).  Education  PPPpcGDP 
  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  YEARS  C. int. 
dollar 
Cluster 1                                         
Average  46,7  60,3  30,2  26,8  23,2  12,9  33,3  47,8  13,5  10,1  6,5  5,3  3,0  2,2  31,2  22,4  12,5  12,1  8,0  7054,7 
Std. Deviation  6,0  7,0  4,9  4,1  3,2  3,3  4,4  6,5  2,2  1,7  2,3  1,9  1,2  1,0  3,8  2,7  2,2  4,0  1,5  2637,0 
Coef. of variation  12,8  11,5  16,4  15,5  13,9  25,5  13,2  13,6  16,4  16,6  35,4  35,1  40,3  46,3  12,2  12,2  18,0  32,8  19,0  37,4 
                                         
Cluster 2                                         
Average  34,0  42,1  36,8  37,4  29,2  20,5  21,5  29,3  16,0  12,0  8,1  7,4  2,9  2,4  32,3  28,1  19,1  21,0  10,6  10420,6 
Std. Deviation  3,8  3,5  3,7  2,8  2,3  2,2  2,1  2,8  3,8  2,0  2,4  1,5  1,2  0,9  3,0  2,5  2,5  3,2  1,0  1162,6 
Coef. of variation  11,3  8,4  10,0  7,4  7,7  10,6  9,6  9,6  23,6  17,1  29,7  21,0  41,1  37,9  9,3  8,9  13,2  15,1  9,4  11,2 
Source: Idem Table 2 
 
Table 5: Absolute distances of countries included in Cluster 1 relative to average values of cluster 2 (%) 











(%).  Education  PPPpcGDP 
  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  YEARS  C. int. 
dollar 
Austria  8,0  14,4  -1,0  -9,4  -7,0  -5,0  6,7  13,5  -1,1  -0,2  -2,0  -0,9  -0,5  -0,4  -0,4  -5,5  -2,6  -6,4  -0,3  74,4 
Finland  3,5  9,7  1,4  -3,8  -4,9  -5,9  11,9  14,0  -2,8  -3,3  -1,8  -1,8  -0,9  -0,9  -2,3  -4,5  -4,1  -3,4  -1,1  -1657,0 
Greece  19,4  27,7  -14,9  -17,4  -4,5  -10,4  17,4  26,3  -6,5  -2,2  -5,2  -4,1  -1,9  -1,4  2,3  -7,5  -6,2  -11,1  -2,7  -1905,3 
Ireland  15,7  13,0  -12,5  -9,2  -3,2  -3,8  14,2  13,4  -2,2  1,1  3,1  -2,3  0,2  -0,5  -8,0  -6,8  -7,4  -4,9  -2,2  -3808,2 
Italy  8,2  9,9  -5,7  -6,0  -2,5  -3,9  8,4  11,1  -2,6  -0,1  1,1  -0,5  0,8  0,3  -1,3  -5,8  -6,4  -5,0  -3,3  -1421,3 
Japan  7,7  15,7  -4,7  -10,0  -3,0  -5,7  7,5  16,4  -2,6  -3,5  -1,7  -0,3  1,0  0,1  5,4  1,0  -9,7  -13,7  -0,5  -1519,3 
Korea  23,2  29,6  -10,5  -16,6  -12,8  -13,0  20,2  30,4  -3,4  -4,1  -3,3  -3,1  1,4  0,0  -5,2  -8,5  -9,6  -14,6  -3,8  -7933,8 
Portugal  15,3  22,1  -6,3  -11,3  -9,0  -10,7  11,9  25,1  -4,3  -2,3  -2,0  -5,0  -0,7  -0,7  1,5  -8,2  -6,3  -8,9  -3,7  -5290,5 
Spain  12,6  18,7  -7,0  -11,4  -5,6  -7,3  10,6  17,1  -1,2  -1,0  -2,8  -3,4  0,0  -0,4  -0,4  -4,4  -6,2  -7,9  -4,3  -3133,1 
Taiwan  13,0  21,4  -4,9  -10,7  -8,1  -10,7  8,8  18,4  2,0  -2,5  -1,6  0,9  2,1  2,3  -3,0  -6,6  -8,4  -12,5  -4,2  -7064,9 
Source: Idem Table 2. Notes: Absolute distance is calculated as the difference between the country’s variable value and the corresponding average value of cluster 2.   13
3.  Descriptive  characterisation  of  the  growth  and  structural  change  processes  of 
‘relatively less developed countries’ countries between 1979 and 2003 
Countries in Cluster 1 – ‘relatively less developed countries’, which were rather similar in 
terms of  economic structure in 1979, experienced very different processes of  growth  and 
structural  change  from  that  time  onwards,  which  gave  rise  to  a  marked  increase  in  their 
dissimilarities.  Differences  in  per  capita  GDP,  for  example,  were  strongly  amplified  (see 
standard deviation figures in Table 6), given the profound differences in average growth rates 
of  real  GDP  during  this  period.  Korea,  Ireland  and  Taiwan  experienced  very  high  GDP 
growth rates, whereas in the other countries, average GDP growth did not surpass 3% per 
annum (cf. Table 6).  
 
Table 6: GDP at constant prices and GDP per capita based on purchasing-power-parity (annual % change; 1980-
2003) 
  GDP constant prices   GDP per capita (PPP) 
  1980-86  1987-94  1995-03  1980-03  1980-86  1987-94  1995-03  1980-03 
Austria  1,6  2,6  2,2  2,2  6,3  5,0  3,8  4,9 
Finland  2,7  0,8  3,8  2,4  7,0  3,4  5,4  5,1 
Greece  0,2  1,4  3,6  2,0  4,3  3,5  5,0  4,3 
Ireland  1,5  4,2  8,2  5,0  5,5  7,1  9,0  7,4 
Italy  1,9  2,0  1,6  1,8  6,6  5,0  3,4  4,8 
Japan  3,1  3,3  1,0  2,3  7,2  6,0  2,6  5,0 
Korea  8,3  8,4  5,0  7,0  11,9  10,6  6,1  9,1 
Portugal  1,8  4,3  2,7  3,0  6,3  7,4  4,0  5,8 
Spain  1,7  3,0  3,8  3,0  5,9  5,8  4,9  5,5 
Taiwan   7,5  8,1  4,6  6,5  10,9  10,2  5,7  8,6 
Std deviation GDP per capita PPP              
1980  2637,0               
2003  5081,6               
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008 
 
Considerable differences arose, at the same time, with respect to labour productivity growth 
(cf. Table 7). Once again, higher growth rates occurred in Korea, Taiwan and Ireland, well 
above the ones observed in the other countries considered.    14
Table 7: Annual average labour productivity growth (%; 1979-2003) 
  1979-1986  1987-1994  1995-2003  1979-2003 
Austria  2,36  2,81  2,69  2,63 
Finland  2,98  3,43  2,58  2,98 
Greece  1,04  0,69  2,83  1,59 
Ireland  3,61  4,29  6,78  5,02 
Italy  1,84  2,20  0,78  1,56 
Japan   3,41  4,05  2,63  3,36 
Korea  5,55  6,24  5,20  5,67 
Portugal  3,71  2,89  1,81  2,72 
Spain  4,22  1,54  0,74  2,01 
Taiwan  6,15  7,11  7,24  6,86 
Source: GGDC 60-Industry Database 
Notes: 1) Reference period: 1995-2002; 2) Reference period: 1979-2002.  
 
Furthermore,  rapid  growth  experiences  were  intimately  connected  with  strong  structural 
transformation. The computation of Nickell and Lilien indices of structural change (cf. Table 
8)  reveals  that  the  fastest  growth  countries  –  Korea,  Taiwan  and  Ireland  –  were 
simultaneously  the  countries  with  more  rapid  structural  change  during  the  period  under 
study.
12 In contrast, slow-growing countries such as Greece or Italy experienced much more 
modest changes. This is in broad agreement with the views expressed by the authors from the 
new structuralist approach (e.g., Pieper, 2000; Rada and Taylor, 2006), according to which 
rapid growth requires profound changes in the composition of economic activity and external 
trade.  
The countries with faster structural change were also the ones experiencing more profound 
changes in the relative importance of the industry groups defined earlier. Korea, Ireland and 
Taiwan were the countries in which the decrease in the relative share of low-skill industries 
was more intense. The lower importance of these industries was compensated by a substantial 
increase in high-skill industries, particularly in the cases of Ireland and Korea. Ireland, Korea 
and Taiwan also presented the largest decrease in supplier-dominated industries, which, as 
indicated  earlier,  are  the  industries  facing  lower  technological  opportunities.  In  contrast, 
relative shares of specialised supplier and science-based industries – Pavitt’s top categories in 




                                                 
12 See Lilien (1982) and Nickell (1985) for details on the computation of these indices. 
13 In Taiwan and Korea there was however a small decline in the relative importance of science based industries.   15
Table 8: Nickell and Lilien indices of structural change (1979-2003)
1 
  1979-1986  1987-1994  1995-2003  1979-2003 
Nickell index         
Austria  0,185  0,188  0,214  0,527 
Finland  0,213  0,227  0,318  0,735 
Greece  0,166  0,187  0,386  0,475 
Ireland  0,313  0,265  0,526  0,885 
Italy  0,200  0,143  0,207  0,505 
Japan  0,234  0,188  0,190
2  0,463
3 
Korea  0,389  0,367  0,317
2  0,882
3 
Portugal  0,223  0,310  0,245  0,601 
Spain  0,242  0,182  0,187  0,472 
Taiwan  0,277  0,359  0,283
2  0,807
3 
Lilien index         
Austria  0,138  0,132  0,139  0,274 
Finland  0,162  0,176  0,190  0,404 
Greece  0,119  0,136  0,205  0,315 
Ireland  0,243  0,214  0,364  0,566 
Italy  0,169  0,111  0,136  0,381 
Japan  0,163  0,128  0,164
2  0,352
3 
Korea  0,281  0,298  0,224
2  0,635
3 
Portugal  0,164  0,258  0,184  0,477 
Spain  0,189  0,138  0,128  0,346 
Taiwan  0,195  0,307  0,205
2  0,574
3 
Source: GGDC 60-Industry Database 
Notes:  1)  Indices  are  calculated  considering  56  sectors  and  sectoral  proportions  in  value  added.  2)  Reference  period:  1995-2002.  3) 
Reference period: 1979-2002.  
 
Given the profound changes in the structure of their economies, it is no surprise that Korea, 
Ireland and Taiwan have been able to significantly modify their situation in comparison to the 
more developed countries included in Cluster 2. Indeed, as can be seen from Table 10, these 
countries have severely reduced the gap regarding the relative importance of low-skill and 
supplier-dominated industries, and converged, at the same time, in the more technological and 
skill-intensive categories. In the case of Ireland, in particular, there was not only a drastic 
reduction in the low-tech and low-skill industries distances, but also a substantial increase in 
the already positive gap with respect to specialised supplier and science-based industries.  
 
   16 
Table 9: Industry shares in VAB in 2003 and variation between 1979 and 2003 (%) 
  Low-skill  Medium-skill  High-skill  Sup.-Dominated  Scale-intensive  Spec. supplier  Science-based  Inf.-Intensive  Non-market serv. 
  VAB  Var. 79-03  VAB  Var. 79-03  VAB  Var. 79-03  VAB  Var. 79-03  VAB  Var. 79-03  VAB  Var. 79-03  VAB  Var. 79-03  VAB  Var. 79-03  VAB  Var. 79-03 
Austria  33,4  -8,6  35,6  -0,1  31,0  8,7  24,3  -3,9  11,1  -3,7  10,8  4,7  2,0  -0,4  35,9  4,0  16,0  -0,6 
Finland  24,2  -13,3  41,9  3,7  33,9  9,6  22,2  -11,2  8,7  -4,5  13,2  6,9  2,2  0,2  35,2  5,1  18,5  3,4 
Greece  42,4  -10,9  29,1  7,2  28,5  3,8  31,5  -7,4  8,4  -1,1  3,1  0,2  0,8  -0,1  38,8  4,1  17,3  4,4 
Ireland  28,1  -21,5  28,9  4,6  42,9  16,9  21,3  -14,5  8,2  -5,6  16,8  5,5  14,6  11,6  24,5  0,2  14,6  2,8 
Italy  31,9  -10,4  32,3  1,2  35,8  9,1  22,8  -7,2  10,2  -3,2  11,1  1,8  2,2  -1,5  38,1  7,1  15,6  2,8 
Japan
1  31,1  -10,6  34,2  2,2  34,7  8,5  23,5  -5,6  10,3  -3,1  8,0  1,5  2,7  -1,2  44,7  7,0  10,8  1,4 
Korea
1  33,6  -23,6  34,0  7,7  32,4  16,0  24,2  -17,5  17,1  4,6  9,5  4,8  3,7  -0,6  32,1  4,9  13,3  3,8 
Portugal  34,2  -15,1  36,8  6,3  29,1  8,8  24,9  -8,5  9,9  -1,7  4,6  -1,5  1,4  -0,7  35,7  1,9  23,5  10,7 
Spain  39,8  -6,8  30,3  0,6  29,9  6,2  30,4  -1,7  10,5  -4,3  7,1  1,8  2,2  -0,7  33,5  1,6  16,3  3,4 
Taiwan
1  26,9  -20,1  42,2  10,3  30,9  9,8  15,3  -15,0  12,3  -5,7  10,7  4,2  3,1  -1,9  43,9  14,5  14,7  3,9 
Note: 1) Reference period: 1979-2002. 
Table 10: Absolute differences in VAB industry group shares of countries included in cluster 1 relative to average values of cluster 2 (1979, 2003; %)  
  Low-skill  Medium-skill  High-skill  Sup.-Dominated  Scale-intensive  Spec. supplier  Science-based  Inf.-Intensive  Non-market serv. 
  1979  2003  1979  2003  1979  2003  1979  2003  1979  2003  1979  2003  1979  2003  1979  2003  1979  2003 
Austria  8,0  6,2  -1,0  -1,0  -7,0  -5,2  6,7  6,3  -1,1  -1,4  -2,0  0,4  -0,5  -0,4  -0,4  -1,3  -2,6  -3,7 
Finland  3,5  -3,0  1,4  5,2  -4,9  -2,2  11,9  4,3  -2,8  -3,8  -1,8  2,9  -0,9  -0,2  -2,3  -2,0  -4,1  -1,2 
Greece  19,4  15,2  -14,9  -7,6  -4,5  -7,7  17,4  13,6  -6,5  -4,1  -5,2  -7,2  -1,9  -1,6  2,3  1,6  -6,2  -2,3 
Ireland  15,7  0,9  -12,5  -7,7  -3,2  6,8  14,2  3,3  -2,2  -4,3  3,1  6,5  0,2  12,2  -8,0  -12,6  -7,4  -5,1 
Italy  8,2  4,7  -5,7  -4,4  -2,5  -0,3  8,4  4,8  -2,6  -2,3  1,1  0,8  0,8  -0,2  -1,3  1,0  -6,4  -4,1 
Japan
1  7,7  3,9  -4,7  -2,4  -3,0  -1,5  7,5  5,6  -2,6  -2,2  -1,7  -2,4  1,0  0,3  5,4  7,6  -9,7  -8,9 
Korea
1  23,2  6,4  -10,5  -2,7  -12,8  -3,7  20,2  6,3  -3,4  4,6  -3,3  -0,8  1,4  1,3  -5,2  -5,1  -9,6  -6,4 
Portugal  15,3  7,0  -6,3  0,1  -9,0  -7,1  11,9  7,0  -4,3  -2,6  -2,0  -5,7  -0,7  -1,0  1,5  -1,5  -6,3  3,8 
Spain  12,6  12,6  -7,0  -6,3  -5,6  -6,3  10,6  12,5  -1,2  -2,0  -2,8  -3,2  0,0  -0,2  -0,4  -3,6  -6,2  -3,4 
Taiwan
1  13,0  -0,3  -4,9  5,6  -8,1  -5,2  8,8  -2,6  2,0  -0,2  -1,6  0,4  2,1  0,7  -3,0  6,7  -8,4  -5,0 
Note: 1) Reference period: 1979-2002.   17
Our findings seem to indicate furthermore that the influence of structural change on economic 
growth depends on its association with technological change. The case of Portugal is rather 
illustrative of this point. Despite showing relatively fast structural change between 1979 and 
2003, Portugal did not significantly change the composition of its economy in terms of the 
industry groups considered. The country was able to reduce the relative importance of low-
skill and supplier-dominated industries and to increase high-skill industry shares, but the rate 
at which this transformation took place was relatively low. Moreover, and quite significantly, 
the most important change observed during this period refers to non-market services, which 
increased their relative importance in about 11 percentage points. This has probably had an 
influence on the relatively poor performance of the Portuguese economy, when compared to 
other countries in the sample.  
Considerable changes in education also came into play during this period.
14 All the countries 
increased the average number of years of formal education of the working age population, 
expanding human capital stocks (cf. Table 11). However, the rates at which this increase took 
place  differed  significantly  across  countries.  Korea  shows  once  more  an  impressive 
performance, along with Spain, Italy and Taiwan. Portugal, on the other hand, presents the 
weakest increase in the average number of years of formal education, and is the only country 
which widens the gap in comparison to the countries in cluster 2.  
Table 11: Average number of years of formal education of the working age population (25-64 years) (1979-
2003) 
  Years  % change  Education gap
1 
  1979  2003  1979-2003  1979  2003  Var. (years) 
Austria  10,3  12,2  18,8  -0,3  -0,1  0,2 
Finland  9,5  12,5  31,3  -1,1  0,1  1,2 
Greece  7,9  10,4  32,0  -2,7  -1,9  0,8 
Ireland  8,4  10,9  29,7  -2,2  -1,5  0,7 
Italy  7,3  10,4  42,7  -3,3  -1,9  1,4 
Japan   10,1  12,7  25,8  -0,5  0,3  0,8 
Korea  6,8  10,8  59,3  -3,8  -1,5  2,3 
Portugal   6,9  8,0  16,6  -3,7  -4,3  -0,6 
Spain  6,3  9,7  54,4  -4,3  -2,6  1,7 
Taiwan  6,4  8,8  38,9  -4,2  -3,5  0,7 
Notes: 1) The education gap is defined as the difference between the country’s value and the average of countries included in cluster 2. 
                                                 
14 In order to get a full series of education data we extended Bassanini and Scarpetta’s (2001) estimates up to 
2003 using the author’s methodology. We also applied this procedure to Korean and Taiwanese data, considering 
Barro and Lee’s (2001) estimates. The complete data set and some details on the calculus procedure can be 
found in the annex.   18
The significant changes taking place during the period under study in each of the individual 
dimensions  considered  led  to  a  substantial  modification  in  the  comparative  situation  of 
countries. This becomes more evident when cluster analysis is performed once more, this time 
considering 2003 figures.
15 In this case, the splitting of countries into two clusters is no longer 
clear-cut (cf. Figure 2). As a matter of fact, the clustering solution is somewhat unsatisfactory, 
since  it  does  not  provide  a  strong  classification.  A  quite  different  outcome  is  now  also 
admissible, characterised by four clusters with the following composition:  
1)  Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Japan, Korea, Italy and Taiwan; 
2)  Australia, Canada, Norway; 
3)  Denmark, Netherlands, US, France, UK, Finland, Sweden, Belgium and Germany; 
4)  Ireland. 
 
      C A S E       0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label        Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  Greece         9   ─┬─────┐ 
  Spain         17   ─┘     ├───────────┐ 
  Portugal      16   ───────┘           ├─┐ 
  Austria        2   ───────────────────┘ ├─────────┐ 
  Japan         12   ───────────┬─────────┘         ├───────┐ 
  Korea         13   ───────────┘                   │       │ 
  Italy         11   ───────────────────────┬───────┘       ├─────────┐ 
  Taiwan        19   ───────────────────────┘               │         │ 
  Australia      1   ─────┬─────────────────┐               │         │ 
  Canada         4   ─────┘                 ├───────────────┘         │ 
  Norway        15   ───────────────────────┘                         │ 
  Denmark        5   ─┬─────┐                                         │ 
  Netherlands   14   ─┘     ├─────────┐                               │ 
  US            21   ───────┘         ├─────┐                         │ 
  France         7   ─────────────┬───┘     │                         │ 
  UK            20   ─────────────┘         ├─────────────┐           │ 
  Finland        6   ───────┬─────────────┐ │             │           │ 
  Sweden        18   ───────┘             ├─┘             ├───────────┘ 
  Belgium        3   ─────────┬───────────┘               │ 
  Germany        8   ─────────┘                           │ 
  Ireland       10   ─────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 
Figure 2: Dendrogram using average linkage between groups and the cosine similarity measure (2003) 
 
Overall there is an increase in the countries’ dissimilarities and some countries experience 
considerable changes, moving to very different clusters in comparison to the initial ones. This 
is the case of Finland, for example, and Ireland, which now stands alone in cluster 4.
16 Korea 
                                                 
15 Data used to perform cluster analysis for 2003 can be found in the annex. 
16 As already noted, the initial inclusion of Finland in the cluster of relatively less developed countries was due 
to differences in the composition of economic activity, and particularly its stronger reliance on low-skill and 
supplier-dominated  industries,  and  correlative  deficit  in  high-skill  and  high  technological  opportunities 
industries. An analysis of the overall evolution of the country during this period, and particularly, of Tables 9, 10   19
also experiences a profound change, and is now quite distant from Portugal and Spain (very 
similar countries in 1979), and converging to Japan, which was initially at a considerably 
distance.  
 
4. Regression analysis 
The descriptive analysis developed so far suggests that an explanation for the widely different 
growth patterns observed between 1979 and 2003 for countries included in the relatively less 
developed cluster may reside in their differing ability to promote changes in the economic 
structure towards more skilled and technology-intensive activities. In the present section we 
go  a  step  further  in  the  examination  of  this  hypothesis  by  regressing  actual  productivity 
growth  in  the  VAB  shares  of  some  of  the  categories  in  the  considered  taxonomies  (i.e., 
specialised suppliers, science-based, supplier-dominated and high-skill industries), and their 
changes over time. More precisely, we estimate the following fixed effects panel regression: 
1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , - - - - - - D + + D + + + D + = D t i t i t i t i t i j t i j it INV INV EDUC EDUC x x y y j b g c d a
it i t it EMP e m h w + + + +                                                                                       (1) 
i = country index (i = 1,…, N) 
j = industry group(s) considered  
t = time 
εit= error term 
In this expression, yit is the logarithm of value added over employment (in hours) for country i 
in period t, N is the number of countries and xi represents the VAB shares of the selected 
groups of industries in country i. The symbol   denotes first differences, for example,  yit is 
the change in the logarithm of value added per hour over a one-year period, or yit - yi,t-1.
17 
Industry group shares (xi) and their annual changes ( xi) are expressed in lagged values so 
that causality runs from industrial structure to productivity growth, and not the other way 
around.  δ  and  χ  are  expected  to  be  positive  when  industry  shares  refer  to  high-skill, 
specialised supplier and science-based industries, given their high productivity growth rates 
and the indirect positive effects they generate to other industries, through producer and user-
related  spillovers.  More  precisely,  products  and  innovations  originating  in  skills  and 
                                                                                                                                                          
and 11, reveals, however, that Finland underwent profound structural transformation between 1979 and 2003, 
coming quite close to the structure of the countries initially included in cluster 2, while maintaining relative 
closeness in relation to the other dimensions considered (education and per capita income).  
17 Although other time intervals could be considered, such as 5-year or 10-year intervals, only the use of annual 
data can take into account all the available information.    20
technology-intensive  sectors  are  likely  to  be  conducive  to  productivity  gains  in  other 
industries which use these products or find new applications for the innovations developed, 
and  therefore  increase  productivity.  Inversely,  a  negative  sign  is  expected  when  supplier-
dominated industry shares are considered.  
A number of  control variables are also included. The  first of such variables is education 
(EDUC), expressed by the average years of education of the working age population, and its 
growth rate ( EDUC). Once again these variables are expressed in lagged values in order to 
mitigate  possible  endogeneity  problems.  An  extensive  and  ever-growing  literature  (e.g., 
Temple 1999, 2000; Lucas, 1998; Nelson and Phelps, 1966) attests the virtuous effects of the 
rise in human capital stock on growth, and therefore we expect both γ and β to be positive. 
The  influence  of  physical  capital  accumulation  is  also  taken  into  account  through  the 
inclusion of both the lagged values of the share of investment in GDP (INVi,t-1) and its growth 
rate. The renewal rate of capital stock may influence positively productivity growth in various 
ways,  namely  through  the  embodiment  of  technology  and  innovation,
18  and  consequently 
coefficients φ and ψ are expected to be positive. Finally, we control for business cycle effects 
including time dummies (ηt), and using the employment rate (EMP) to account for country-
specific  economic  fluctuations.
19  Given  the  procyclical  nature  of  labour  productivity,  we 
expect ω to be positive.  
The estimations are carried out considering the sample of countries included in Cluster 1 over 
the 1980-2003 period.
20 The data source of industry VAB shares is the 60-Industry GGDC 
Database. Data on education were taken from Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) and Barro and 
Lee (2001), and extended up to 2003 using OECD Education at a Glance data, as indicated in 
the previous section. Data on GDP and gross fixed capital formation are from the OECD 
Factbook  2008:  Economic,  Environmental  and  Social  Statistics,  with  the  exception  of 
Taiwan, whose data was taken from the Taiwanese government official statistics.
21 Finally, 
employment  rates  are  taken  from  the  World  Economic  Outlook  Database  (April  2008), 
developed by the International Monetary Fund.  
Table 12 presents the estimation results.  
                                                 
18 See in this respect Kaldor (1957) and, more recently, DeLong and Summers (1991). 
19 Both variables have been used previously in the literature to account for the influence of business cycle 
effects. See, for example, Peneder (2003). 
20 One observation was lost (1979), because data on employment and investment variables was only available 
from 1980 onwards. Data regarding Taiwan, Korea and Japan refer to the 1980-2002 period. 
21 Available on-line at http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw.   21 
Table 12: The effect of structural change on productivity growth  
Variable  Parameter  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
∆x_high skill (t-1)  δ      0.139**  (2.188)      0.146*  (1.868) 
∆x_science-based (t-1)  δ          0.001  (0.035)  -0.001  (-0.063) 
∆x_spec. supplier (t-1)  δ          0.006  (0.186)  0.005  (0.171) 
∆x_sup.-dominated (t-1)  δ          -0.0983  (-1.399)  -0.0172  (-0.208) 
x_high-skill (t-1)  χ      0.125  (1.008)      -0.253  (-1.315) 
x_science-based (t-1)  χ          0.351**  (2.545)  0.316**  (2.182) 
x_specialised supplier (t-1)  χ          -0.122  (-0.753)  -0.058  (-0.356) 
x_supplier-dominated (t-1)  χ   
      -0.148  (-1.279)  -0.322**  (-2.021) 
EDUCt-1  γ  -0.504  (-0.961)  -0.544  (-1.044)  -0.421  (-0.745)  -0.545  (-0.962) 
∆EDUCt-1  β  0.037  (0.163)  0.105  (0.437)  0.128  (0.531)  0.109  (0.450) 
INVt-1  φ  -0.042  (-0.564)  -0.028  (-0.373)  0.044  (0.544)  0.076  (0.905) 
∆INVt-1  ψ  0.072***  (2.674)  0.077***  (2.903)  0.066**  (2.387)  0.054*  (1.887) 
EMP  ω  0.001  (0.013)  -0.023  (0.7410)  -0.103  (-1.342)  -0.083  (-1.090) 
R
2    0,52    0,55    0,56    0,57   
Nr. of observations    227    227    227    227   
Nr. of countries    10    10    10    10   
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of value added per hour worked;  var, variable in first differences;  var(t-1) lagged differences. Time dummies (ηt) included. T-values between brackets. 
***, **, * Significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level. 
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The  results  confirm  our  hypothesis  according  to  which  structure  influences  (labour) 
productivity growth. In global terms, the coefficients for the structural variables turn up with 
the  expected  signs  and  are  significant,  even  when  all  the  variables  are  included  in  the 
regression  (Specification  iv).  The  lagged  change  in  high-skill  industries  share  affects 
positively labour productivity growth, which also applies with respect to the lagged share of 
science-based industries. Regarding the latter, an increase in one percentage point results in 
additional  productivity  growth  of  about  0.3  percentage  points  (Specifications  iii  and  iv), 
which is a rather strong impact. In contrast, and as expected, an increase in the VAB share of 
supplier-dominated  industries  results  in  a  decline  in  labour  productivity  growth.
22  Only 
variables for specialised supplier industries are deemed to be non-significant.  
Regarding the conditioning variables, only the coefficient for the lagged variation of the share 
of investment in GDP turns up significant. This variable shows strong robustness, presenting 
coefficients ranging between 0.05 and 0.08, approximately, which are significant in all the 
specifications estimated. The employment rate, used to control for the influence of country-
specific business cycles, is always non-significant.  
In terms of education, the level variable (EDUC) presents a negative sign, although it is never 
statistically significant. When variation in educational achievements is considered, however, 
the  coefficient  for  the  education  variable  turns  up  with  the  right  sign,  although  it  is  not 
statistically significant. The negative sign (although insignificant) of the EDUC variable may 
be due to the fact that countries with relatively poor educational achievements (in levels) in 
our  sample  were  simultaneously  the  ones  experiencing  higher  productivity  growth 
performances.  Furthermore,  the  overall  counterintuitive  result  of  education  having  an 
insignificant  impact  on  productivity  growth  may  result  from  the  fact  that  our  education 
indicator takes solely into account advances in formal education, excluding other forms of 
learning,  and  neglecting,  at  the  same  time,  differences  in  the  quality  of  educational 
attainments. 
23 
The positive effect of both high-skill and science-based industries on productivity growth, 
controlling  for  the  influence  of  other  variables  that  might  also  influence  growth,  and 
particularly  its  strong  impact,  considerably  above  investment  in  physical  capital,  gives 
empirical support to our hypothesis according to which substantial benefits have accrued to 
                                                 
22 The coefficient regarding this variable turns up insignificant, however, in specification iii. 
23 The insignificant contribution of human capital to productivity growth appears many times in the literature, 
especially when panel data is used. See Temple (1999) for a detailed analysis of the possible causes behind this 
counterintuitive result.   23
countries that successfully  changed their structure towards more technologically  advanced 
industries. Moreover, the fact that two of the three industries included within the science-
based  group  are  ICT-related  industries  (“Radio  and  television  receivers”,  and  “Other 
electronic  machinery  and  apparatus”)  seems  to  be  in  global  agreement  with  the  techno-
economic  paradigm  conceptualisations  developed  within  neo-Schumpeterian  strands  of 
research.  Those  theories  strongly  emphasise  the  links  between  the  local  development  of 
industries  associated  with  the  dominant  technological  paradigm,  which  in  this  period  is 
represented by the ‘electronic revolution’, and the overall growth prospects of the economy. 
Technical change is conceived as a cumulative and path-dependent ‘learning’ process that is 
strongly embedded in organisational and institutional structures. Consequently, in order to 
fully exploit the benefits arising from new techno-economic paradigms, changes must occur 
in the industrial composition of the economy, along with wider changes in institutional and 
socio-economic levels.  
We now investigate further this hypothesis by estimating Equation (1) once more, this time 
considering the ICT taxonomy used by van Ark and Bartelsman (van Ark and Bartelsman, 
2004), which ranks industries according to their production or use of ICT. Table 13 presents 
the results. 
As in the previous regressions, an increase in the investment growth rate exerts a positive 
influence on productivity growth. More precisely, an increase in the growth rate of investment 
by one percentage point amounts to an increase in labour productivity growth of about 0.07 
percentage points. The other control variables are once again statistically insignificant. 
The  contribution  of  the  lagged  share  of  ICT-producing  manufacturing  industries  is 
significantly  positive  when  taken  in  isolation,  and  has  a  strong  impact  on  the  growth  of 
productivity.  A  difference  of  one  percentage  point  in  the  ICT-producing  manufacturing 
lagged  share  gives  a  difference  of  over  0.3  percentage  points  in  the  annual  productivity 
growth rate. However, when ICT-producing services are included, the χ coefficient ceases to 
be significant at the conventional significance levels, although keeping the correct sign and 
the relative magnitude. This might be due to a multicollinearity problem.  
The coefficients for the lagged change in the share of ICT-producing services industries are 
always positive and statistically significant. In contrast, there is no significant impact of ICT-
using industries on annual productivity growth. 
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Table 13: The effect of structure and structural change on productivity growth _ICTs 
Variable  Parameter  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii)  (ix)  (x)  (viii) 
∆x_ICTPM (t-1)  δ  -0.008  (-0.616)      -0.004  (-0.295)              -0.006  (-0.396) 
∆x_ICTPS (t-1)  δ      0.056**  (2.185)  0.050*  (1.931)              0.049*  (1.807) 
∆x_ICTUM (t-1)  δ              -0.001  (-0.020)      -0.007  (-0.192)  0.011  (0.288) 
∆x_ICTUS (t-1)  δ                  -0.037  (-0.707)  -0.040  (-0.722)  -0.021  (-0.375) 
x_ICTPM (t-1)  χ  0.361*  (1.675)      0.311  (1.392)              0.346  (1.450) 
x_ICTPS (t-1)  χ      -0.218  (-0.548)  -0.324  (-0.802)              -0.328  (-0.742) 
x_ICTUM (t-1)  χ              -0.106  (-0.416)      0.042  (0.122)  -0.139  (-0.379) 
x_ICTUS (t-1)  χ                  0.086  (0.724)  0.098  (0.590)  -0.022  (-0.125) 
EDUCt-1  γ  -0.653  (-1.228)  -0.381  (-0.725)  -0.538  (-1.003)  -0.526  (-0.987)  -0.566  (-1.058)  -0.556  (-1.028)  -0.575  (-1.040) 
∆EDUCt-1  β  0.067  (0.288)  0.072  0.303  0.114  (0.473)  0.014  (0.057)  0.052  (0.223)  0.064  (0.255)  0.088  (0.342) 
INVt-1  φ  -0.011  (-0.139)  -0.037  (-0.500)  -0.008  (-0.097)  -0.053  (-0.671)  -0.050  (-0.644)  -0.048  (-0.597)  -0.010  (-0.126) 
∆INVt-1  ψ  0.069**  (2.554)  0.066**  (2.378)  0.061**  (2.192)  0.074***  2.694  0.076***  (2.776)  0.076***  (2.718)  0.064**  (2.186) 
EMP  ω  -0.023  (-0.337)  0.002  (0.036)  -0.012  (-0.171)  0.019  (0.236)  0.013  (0.179)  0.007  (0.078)  0.005  (0.054) 
R
2    0,54    0,54    0,55    0,53    0,53    0,53    0,55   
Nr. of observations    227    227    227        227    227    227   
Nr. of countries    10        10    10    10    10    10   
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of value added per hour worked;  var, variable in first differences;  var(t-1) lagged differences.  
ICTPM- ICT producing manufacturing; ICTPS – ICT producing services; ICTUM – ICT using manufacturing; ICTUS – ICT using services. Time dummies (ηt) included.  
T-values between brackets. ***, **, * Significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level. 
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Taken as a whole, these results lend some support to the view that ICT-related industries are 
strategic branches of economic activity, but only when producing industries are considered. 
This accentuates the fact that most spillovers from advanced industries, and particularly ICT-
producing industries are local and national in character, and therefore that ‘buying’ is not the 
same  as  ‘producing’.  Hence,  our  results  may  be  seen  as  reinforcing  previous  empirical 
evidence  indicating  that  the  gains  from  the  diffusion  of  new  technologies  are  especially 
relevant in economies which produce these technologies (e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993; Maurseth and 
Verspagen, 1999; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). 
5. Conclusion 
This  paper  investigates  the  relationship  between  structural  and  technological  change  and 
economic growth, taking into account a number of relatively less developed countries in the 
late 1970s. According to neo-Schumpeterian theses, there are reasons to expect technological 
leading  industries,  and  particularly  those  more  closely  related  to  new  technological 
paradigms, to have a major influence on growth. Moreover, according to some of the views 
expressed (e.g., Perez, 1985), it is precisely in periods of transition and emergence of new 
techno-economic  paradigms  that  the  relatively  less  developed  countries  have  higher 
opportunities to catch-up.  
The preliminary descriptive analysis undertaken revealed that rapid growth experiences were 
intimately connected with strong structural transformation, measured by the computation of 
Nickell and Lilien indices. Furthermore, the countries with faster structural change were also 
the  ones  experiencing  more  profound  increases  in  the  relative  importance  of  skills  and 
innovation-intensive industries, and the largest decreases in low-skill and supplier-dominated 
industries. These results suggested that an explanation for the widely different growth patterns 
observed between 1979 and 2003 for the selected countries might reside in their differing 
ability to promote changes in the economic structure towards more skilled and innovation-
intensive activities.  
This hypothesis has been put under examination in the last part of the paper, through the 
estimation of a panel data regression, considering fixed effects methods. According to our 
findings, high-skill and science-based industries have a positive and significant impact on 
productivity growth, considerably above the influence of investment in physical capital. The 
results  thus  provide  empirical  support  to  the  hypothesis  according  to  which  substantial   26
benefits  have  accrued  to  countries  that  successfully  changed  their  structure  towards  more 
technologically advanced industries.  
Moreover,  when  ICT-related  industries  –  the  industries  underlying  the  technological 
revolution  of  the  period  under  analysis  –  are  explicitly  included  in  the  estimation,  the 
coefficients on ICT-producing industries are positive and statistically significant. This result 
lends some support to the view that ICT-related industries are strategic branches of economic 
activity, but only when producing industries are considered. This accentuates the fact that 
most spillovers from advanced industries, and particularly ICT producing industries are local 
and  national  in  character,  and  therefore  that  ‘buying’  is  not  the  same  as  ‘producing’. 
Contrarily to the conclusions presented in other studies (e.g., Barros, 2002), we therefore 
argue  that  the  implementation  of  industrial  policies  aimed  at  changing  the  pattern  of 
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Table A.1: Average years of education of the working age population, 1979-2003 
  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Austria  10,3  10,4  10,5  10,6  10,7  10,8  10,9  10,9  11,0  11,1  11,2  11,3  11,3  11,4  11,4  11,4  11,5  11,6  11,7  11,8  11,9  12,1  12,1  12,2  12,2 
Finland  9,5  9,6  9,7  9,7  9,8  9,9  10,0  10,1  10,1  10,2  10,3  10,4  10,5  10,6  10,7  10,8  10,9  11,0  11,1  11,2  11,5  11,8  12,1  12,4  12,5 
Greece  7,9  7,9  8,0  8,1  8,2  8,2  8,3  8,4  8,5  8,6  8,7  8,8  9,0  9,1  9,2  9,3  9,5  9,6  9,7  9,9  10,2  10,2  10,3  10,4  10,4 
Ireland  8,4  8,5  8,6  8,7  8,8  8,9  9,0  9,0  9,1  9,2  9,3  9,4  9,5  9,6  9,7  9,8  10,0  10,1  10,2  10,3  10,5  10,6  10,8  10,9  10,9 
Italy  7,3  7,3  7,4  7,5  7,6  7,7  7,8  7,9  8,0  8,1  8,2  8,4  8,5  8,6  8,8  9,0  9,2  9,4  9,6  9,8  10,0  10,1  10,2  10,4  10,4 
Japan   10,1  10,2  10,3  10,4  10,5  10,6  10,7  10,8  10,9  11,0  11,1  11,2  11,4  11,5  11,6  11,7  11,9  12,0  12,1  12,3  12,3  12,4  12,5  12,7  12,7 
Korea  6,8  6,8  7,0  7,3  7,5  7,8  8,0  8,3  8,5  8,7  9,0  9,3  9,4  9,6  9,7  9,9  10,1  10,2  10,2  10,3  10,4  10,5  10,5  10,6  10,8 
Portugal   6,9  6,9  6,9  7,0  7,0  7,0  7,1  7,1  7,1  7,2  7,2  7,2  7,3  7,3  7,4  7,5  7,5  7,6  7,7  7,7  7,8  7,8  7,8  7,8  8,0 
Spain  6,3  6,3  6,4  6,5  6,6  6,7  6,8  6,9  7,0  7,1  7,2  7,3  7,5  7,6  7,8  7,9  8,1  8,3  8,5  8,7  9,1  9,3  9,5  9,6  9,7 
Taiwan  6,4  6,4  6,5  6,6  6,7  6,8  6,9  7,0  7,1  7,2  7,3  7,4  7,6  7,7  7,8  7,9  8,0  8,1  8,2  8,3  8,4  8,5  8,6  8,7  8,8 
 
Notes: Data for the 1979-1998 period regarding all countries, except Korea and Taiwan, is from Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001). We extend Bassanini and Scarpetta’s estimates up to 2003, considering data on 
educational attainment from OECD Education at a Glance (various issues), and using the cumulative years of schooling by educational level considered by the authors. 
Data on Korea and Taiwan between 1980 and 2000 is based on Barro and Lee (2001). We interpolate the five-year observations provided by the authors to obtain annual figures for both countries. Education 
estimates for Korea between 2001 and 2003 were obtained considering data on educational attainment from OECD Education at a Glance, and assuming the cumulative years of schooling used by Barro and 
Lee (2001). Finally, estimates regarding Taiwan for 2001, 2002 and 2003 were obtained assuming that the average years of education of the working age population during this period has grown at an annual 
rate similar to the one experienced in the previous quinquennium.  
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Table A.2: Industry shares in VAB and employment hours (%), average number of years of formal education and per capita income (1979, various countries)  
  Low-skill  Medium-skill  High-skill  Sup. Dominated  Scale intensive  Spec. supplier  Science based  Inf. Intensive  Non-market serv.  Education  PPPpcGDP 
  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  VAB  HOURS  YEARS 
C.  int. 
dollar 
Australia  33,0  42,4  30,8  32,6  36,2  25,0  20,9  29,4  13,7  7,9  8,0  8,5  1,1  0,8  40,8  33,2  15,5  20,1  12,6  30.111,5 
Austria  33,4  44,7  35,6  33,7  31,0  21,7  24,3  34,5  11,1  8,1  10,8  9,6  2,0  1,5  35,9  26,7  16,0  19,6  12,2  31.366,3 
Belgium  25,1  29,4  36,2  40,2  38,7  30,3  14,9  19,5  10,4  8,3  15,3  9,1  4,1  2,7  34,3  32,5  21,0  27,9  11,3  29.059,8 
Canada  31,9  40,1  35,1  35,6  32,9  24,3  18,7  28,0  16,1  8,1  6,8  10,1  1,6  0,9  39,4  34,0  17,4  18,9  13,5  31.808,5 
Denmark  25,1  31,1  40,4  42,8  34,5  26,1  18,2  23,0  10,0  6,5  8,8  9,5  2,8  2,1  37,1  29,7  23,1  29,2  11,9  30.302,6 
Finland  24,2  36,5  41,9  41,3  33,9  22,2  22,2  29,8  8,7  6,6  13,2  10,5  2,2  1,5  35,2  25,5  18,5  26,1  12,5  27.492,4 
France  24,7  33,6  35,8  37,8  39,5  28,5  18,9  25,2  8,3  8,0  10,8  10,1  2,0  1,3  38,5  30,6  21,5  24,9  11,4  28.119,5 
Germany   22,3  33,2  38,7  40,5  39,0  26,3  16,7  23,6  11,7  10,3  13,9  11,9  3,9  2,7  36,1  28,2  17,8  23,3  13,5  28.128,9 
Greece  42,4  57,7  29,1  26,3  28,5  16,0  31,5  42,9  8,4  7,9  3,1  5,3  0,8  0,6  38,8  27,5  17,3  15,8  10,4  22.380,9 
Ireland  28,1  42,7  28,9  33,7  42,9  23,6  21,3  33,9  8,2  6,9  16,8  8,9  14,6  2,3  24,5  27,0  14,6  20,9  10,9  34.300,3 
Italy  31,9  40,7  32,3  35,8  35,8  23,4  22,8  34,7  10,2  8,9  11,1  10,7  2,2  1,9  38,1  26,8  15,6  16,8  10,4  26.419,7 
Japan  31,1  53,0  34,2  30,6  34,7  16,4  23,5  44,6  10,3  7,1  8,0  8,5  2,7  2,0  44,7  30,3  10,8  7,4  12,7  27.221,9 
Korea  19,2  52,0  64,9  29,2  15,8  18,7  24,2  40,6  17,1  7,0  9,5  9,4  3,7  2,4  32,1  30,8  13,3  9,8  10,8  18.607,1 
Netherlands  26,7  32,0  39,9  40,3  33,4  27,7  19,0  24,3  10,7  6,1  9,0  9,7  2,7  2,0  37,8  34,0  20,8  24,0  12,3  31.705,6 
Norway  7,9  33,4  65,8  41,8  26,4  24,9  15,4  23,8  27,2  9,1  6,5  7,9  1,1  1,0  31,2  29,1  18,6  29,1  12,3  42.761,4 
Portugal  34,2  49,8  36,8  33,3  29,1  16,9  24,9  41,8  9,9  7,7  4,6  4,1  1,4  1,4  35,7  24,8  23,5  20,3  8,0  18.739,7 
Spain  10,2  47,4  78,2  34,2  11,6  18,5  30,4  37,6  10,5  8,6  7,1  5,9  2,2  1,4  33,5  27,0  16,3  19,4  9,7  24.956,5 
Sweden  21,2  28,2  41,1  44,9  37,7  26,9  18,4  24,3  10,6  7,9  11,9  11,0  3,1  1,6  34,0  25,2  21,9  30,0  12,0  29.250,9 
Taiwan  26,9  42,6  42,2  39,9  30,9  17,5  15,3  30,9  12,3  8,9  10,7  12,9  3,1  2,9  43,9  31,7  14,7  12,8  8,8  22.392,9 
UK  27,0  36,6  33,2  33,6  39,8  29,9  20,3  26,4  9,7  6,5  11,7  9,3  2,1  1,4  39,2  34,6  17,1  21,8  12,1  28.504,4 
US  23,5  33,4  38,5  36,0  38,0  30,6  16,1  24,4  9,0  6,2  10,7  9,1  2,2  1,2  40,3  31,9  21,7  27,3  13,1  37.685,0 
Average  26,2  40,0  40,9  36,4  32,9  23,6  20,9  30,6  11,6  7,8  9,9  9,1  2,9  1,7  36,7  29,6  18,0  21,2  11,6  28.634,1 
Std. Dev.  7,8  8,4  12,8  4,8  7,6  4,8  4,6  7,5  4,3  1,1  3,4  2,1  2,8  0,6  4,5  3,1  3,4  6,3  1,5  5.678,3 
Max.  42,4  57,7  78,2  44,9  42,9  30,6  31,5  44,6  27,2  10,3  16,8  12,9  14,6  2,9  44,7  34,6  23,5  30,0  13,5  42.761,4 
Min.  7,9  28,2  28,9  26,3  11,6  16,0  14,9  19,5  8,2  6,1  3,1  4,1  0,8  0,6  24,5  24,8  10,8  7,4  8,0  18.607,1 
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!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   + ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ (* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿? ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
: ￿ & ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿￿: ￿ & ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿3￿
￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿   ￿# ￿     ￿7 ￿￿ ￿ + ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿ & ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿￿ ￿￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿ & ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿9 ￿
￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿/! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿￿: ￿ & ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 9 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿ & ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿  ￿￿" ￿ ￿ & ￿￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿* ￿ . ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ = > ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿, ￿￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ < . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿ & ￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿   ￿￿￿￿   ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ (* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿   ￿￿￿￿   ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ C￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 D 9 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ (* ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ & > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿￿   1 ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿￿ ￿ & > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ A ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿4 9 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ (* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ (* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 3￿￿
" ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ (* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 33￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿/￿ ￿￿￿E￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿F￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿B ￿￿ & ￿￿￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿￿ < ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿%   ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ < ￿
) % ￿D ￿ % ) % ￿2￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿/￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿￿￿￿ ￿- ￿ (￿ ￿ & E ￿￿￿ ! - ! ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 34 ￿
. ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ < ￿ ￿￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿" ￿￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿, ￿ 1 ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2  ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ! - ! ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 39 ￿
, ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿. ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿/￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ! - ! ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 3￿￿
￿￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿/! ￿ ￿" ￿ ! & ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 4 0 * + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.   ￿
!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ! - ! ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 3￿ ￿
￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ! ￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 3￿￿
￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿/! ￿ ￿￿￿C ￿   ￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ . %
￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ! ￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 3￿ ￿
) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿   ￿￿ ! ; ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿" ￿￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ G ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ! ￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 3￿￿
￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿￿ & ￿ F ￿￿ ￿ & > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿￿   1 ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿￿ ￿ & > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ A ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 3￿ ￿
: ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ - ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿’ ! ￿ (￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿7 ￿ ! - ￿ ￿￿ ￿G￿ ￿   H￿￿   ￿￿￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿
, ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿. ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 3￿
￿! ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿ %￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 4 ￿
5 ￿ 6 ￿ ￿7 ￿ ! (￿ ￿   ￿￿￿2 ￿ ￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿￿*   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 9 ￿
￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿/! ￿ ￿￿￿C ￿   ￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* ￿   ￿ ￿ 7 ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿
9   ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿7 ￿ ￿ - ! ￿ C ￿￿￿   ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 8 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿!￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   G ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ 1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ I ￿￿￿￿   ￿￿￿ J ￿ ￿J ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿
￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿’ ! ￿ (￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿: ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ - ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿￿￿   ￿7 ￿ ! - ￿ ￿￿ ￿G￿ ￿   H￿￿   ￿￿￿9 ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿ ￿
/! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿￿   ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %.   %￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   %￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿
￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ ￿. ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿E￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿? ￿ ￿￿I ￿ ￿ - ￿8 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿" # $ " ￿￿ ￿ ￿" # $ ( ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿￿
, ￿ 1 ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2  ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿   ￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿K ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 ￿ 2= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
￿￿￿￿ 9 3￿
" ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿